Popular British and European newspapers of the era represented the despatch of European troops to Crete as being a humanitarian response to the inter-communal violence taking place on the island, and in particular to the outbreaks of violence in Canea in early 1897. To a certain extent this view is still held today in some quarters, the Intervention being portrayed by some as a move aimed at protecting Cretan Christians from the wrath of Cretan Muslims, or vice-versa.

In reality, one of the principal triggers, if not the main one, for the European Intervention was the movement to the island of some 1,500 Greek troops plus artillery. Commanded by Colonel Timeleon Vassos, this force landed on Crete at Kolymbari on 14 February 1897 and eventually established their base at Alikianos.

While this move was apparently hugely popular with a large proportion of the mainland Greek population and enthusiastically welcomed by numerous Cretan Christians, it was considered by the Ottoman Empire to be an invasion of their sovereign territory and a casus belli, an act which would justify them declaring war on Greece. However, Greek and Ottoman interests were not the only ones involved in the situation. Such a war would, in the eyes of the European Powers, have been detrimental to their interests in that it had the potential to involve them in the conflict, an involvement which could produce catastrophic consequences, particularly in the Balkans.

‘The greatest excitement prevailed in Athens when it was known that two regiments were to be sent to Crete. Thousands of people saw them leave Athens on the 13^th inst. And a large and enthusiastic crowd gathered at Piraeus. At two o’clock the first boatload of men was taken on board, and at about six o’clock the first of the steamers cast off amid the deafening cheers of the crowd.’

In the immediate aftermath of Vassos’ landing, the Ottoman Empire, in spite of its apparent legal justification, evinced no great desire to fight a war. In the event, and despite an incident the same day when a Greek warship opened fire on an Ottoman troopship while the latter was withing Cretan waters, the Porte showed a degree of forbearance, relying on the European Powers to act in their, the Powers’, own interests and take steps to punish Greece for its actions. By now the naval forces of the Powers were operating a policy of preventing both Greek and Ottoman reinforcements being sent to the island, a policy which impacted disproportionately on Greek plans since the Ottomans already had a considerable force in situ on Crete, and Greece was unable to reinforce its initial landing. However, the size and the professional nature of the Greek force, along with the presence of Greek warships in Cretan waters off Canea, produced a threat to the town which could not, militarily, be ignored by the Powers.

Consequently, on 15 April 1897, the European Powers commenced landing their forces in Canea; not so much as to protect the civilian populations of either community, but rather to maintain the status quo in the region.

In the event the Intervention was successful at achieving this aim, at least in the short run. When, in late April 1897, Greek actions on its northern borders between Greece and the Ottoman Empire pushed the Empire into declaring war, there was little or no diplomatic support for Greece within Europe. Consequently, the feared spread of the war did not take place.

The outcome of the ‘30 Days War’ was a military defeat for Greece. However, diplomatic pressure on the part of the Powers reigned in the extent of the Ottoman victories. Paradoxically, the Ottoman Empire, though victorious on the battlefield, emerged from the war in a weaker position than it had started.

As for the Greek troops on Crete, other than taking part in a few minor skirmishes shortly after their arrival, they achieved nothing militarily and were withdrawn in mid May 1897. Greece had sent sufficient troops to Crete to start a war, but too few to finish it.