Tag Archives: European Intervention in Crete 1897 -1913

The Cats of Canea…or, possibly, Spinalonga.

Readers will notice that cats are conspicuously absent from this illustration of French troops in Canea, published in Le Petite Journal on 20th June 1897.

There may be a reason for this.

The following article appeared on page 8 of the Pall Mall Gazette on 1st August 1899:

“WHY THE PET CATS DISAPPEARED.

The Vienna Neue Freie Presse has been publishing some details respecting the behaviour of the international troops quartered in Crete. An entertaining item is given respecting French soldiers. It seems that the second batch of French troops, who came to Crete after the departure of the Turks, seized all the cats they could find in Canea and Halepa and ate them. When, however, a large number of specially pet animals had thus disappeared, a great and indignant outcry on the part of the inhabitants arose. Accordingly the commander, to avoid serious trouble, had to issue a very drastic prohibition of cat-catching, which he embodied in an order of the day. But the practice was checked with difficulty.”

While the above might seem to be nothing more than a bit of anti-French propaganda, it appears that it might have some basis in fact.

Writing a series called Memories of a Sailor, published in the French newspaper “Le Courrier” between 1^st June 1 and 6^th July 1939, Émile Amédée Dupourqué who had been a Lieutenant de Vaisseau (Royal Navy equivalent rank Lieutenant) in the French navy in 1897 and in charge of the fortress of Spinalonga in 1897 and 1898, recalled his time on the island. Writing some 40 years after the events in question, and in articles which undoubtedly embellish those events, after complaining about the difficulties of keeping his men clean and healthy on Spinalonga because of the difficulty obtaining fresh water, he had the following to say about the catering arrangements on the island:

“The officer’s cook …. worthily bore the predestined name of Vatel. In my life, I have not eaten mutton kidneys as well prepared as the ones he served us daily for two years. It was, in short, what was best in animals smelling full of the ooze that Christians provided us. A suckling pig a la palikare [roast suckling pig] was the only variation of our menus until the day when the Admiral gave us a seine [fishing net], the tables were stocked with abundant fish in the bay. I owe it to myself to admit that my sailors had an extraordinary consumption of cats. Soon there were none left on the island where they were very numerous.“

So, it would appear that at one stage at least, and in one location, French troops did indeed consume the local cats!

Many thanks to Jean-Pierre Destelle for the help he gave me writing this piece. I can confirm that although one of his ancestors, Lieutenant-Colonel Émile Honoré DESTELLE was, prior to and at a later date, the Commander of the International troops in Canea, Colonel Destelle’s diary of that period makes no mention of cats! The Colonel does, however, make mention in his diary entry of Sunday 13th November 1898, of an Ottoman Gendarmerie Captain struggling, in vain, to keep his cat dry while being rowed out to his ship during the embarkation of Ottoman troops from Irapetra.

The Commander at the time of the reported cat-catching episode was probably Lieutenant-Colonel René Dominique SPITZER.

The relief of Paraspori, 21 February 1897.

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On 21 February 1897, in response to a plea from Cretan Muslim in a number of villages in the locality of Sitia, villagers, a small French party set out to cover the 12 or so kilometres from Sitia to the village of Paraspori in order to bring the inhabitants to the safety. They were blockaded in the village by Cretan Christian insurgents and feared that they would face massacre if they were to surrender to them. On his return, the commander of the French party, Capitaine de frégate [Commander] Pivet, submitted the following report to his superiors.

Paraspori expedition (February 21, 1897).

Report from Capitaine de Frégate PIVET, Second Officer, to the Commander of the “Suchet“.

On returning from our trip to Paraspori, I have the honor of to report on the mission that you were kind enough to entrust me. On the urgent request that the Muslims stranded in Paraspori and Roukaka had addressed you on February 19, you had obtained from the chiefs of the province, that in recognition of the service you had just returned to their party by releasing their 300 co-religionists blocked in Hierapetra, they would give freedom to Muslims from Paraspori and Roukaka if they consented to surrender their arms. But the Muslims, knowing the cruelty of their enemies, had declared that they would rather die with guns in their hands than run the risk of being slaughtered as soon as they surrendered the guns to them. However, they added that, full of confidence in the protection of the French flag, they would hand themselves, and their families, over to the officer you would send to fetch them, and deliver their weapons.

It was in these circumstances that I left Sitia this morning at 8.30 a.m., taking with me the Master at Arms and eight armed sailors from the Suchet, Ibrahim-Effendi deputy to the caimacan [town governor] of Sitia, and two notables of the city. Mr. Saounazzo, our consular agent at Rethymno, kindly accompanied me as interpreter and as adviser on the wider picture.

At 9.15 a.m. we arrived at Piskokephalo where we are received by all the inhabitants, from adults to old people, armed with Gras rifles. Due to its proximity to Sitia which is the most important Muslim center in the region, this village is the post advance of the Christian party. (This is where the [Christian] Cretan traders from the town of Sitia took refuge and where the insurrectional committee of the province met. [Footnote in the original document.]) As agreed yesterday with the Christian leaders, Mr. Stephanidis, came forward, and Mr. Dernitzakis, a notable in Piskoképhalo, joined us. One of their men carrying a white flag walked at the head of our group, next to the sailor who carried the flag French. Around 10 a.m., approaching the Christian village of Akladia, we saw armed men appear around us who seem to placed in outposts and who, while keeping hidden, follow us. By the time we reach the first houses, the armed inhabitants were coming out on all sides. They have been warned of our passage and did nothing to stop us; but it was easy to see by their scowls that our mission did not have their sympathy. As much as they had been nonchalant in coming to receive us, they are eager to follow us when we got out of the village. This procession could only frighten the women and the children we are going to look for, so I tried to get rid of them by first thanking them for their conduct, and, this procedure not having been successful, strongly urging them to stay at home.

Later in the morning, we arrived at the entrance of Paraspori and I rallied my little detachment to me while, at my request, the headman and M. Dernitzakis strived to mountaineers of Akladia, Skopi and Paraspori, whose appearance is frankly bad, following us. I crossed through the village with the Turkish leaders; it had been abandoned and the inhabitants had taken refuge together in the far end, in an isolated group of 2 or 3 houses which were probably easier for them to defend. In order to inspire their confidence, I had wanted to introduce myself to Muslims under the terms they themselves had indicated to us, that is to say with our flag flying, surrounded by a few armed sailors and accompanied only by Turkish authorities who were to tell them to trust us and tell them that the ‘Mouchavir [Councilor] Ismaïl-Bey ordered them to follow my instructions.’

Fortunately, we were able to reach the door behind which they stood, arms in hand, before the Christians who were gradually gaining ground. Had they come any closer, it was to be feared that being enemies each as fanatic as each other if, so to speak, they came face to face, the guns would go off by themselves. Then not only would we have been caught in the crossfire, but our mission would have completely failed and the situation of the prisoners made even more perilous. Some Turks came out unarmed and, seeing the white flags and the tricolor, they took courage, [acknowledged our authority], and said they are ready to bring me their weapons. During this conference, Christians came forward, and I could tell that the sight of them would prevent the women from coming out. I begged them to go away, even threatened them, but everything was useless; they want to see the weapons, to count them and make sure that the Turks do not have either knife, nor gun on them. They were furious that the Christian chiefs from Piskokephalo had consented to the weapons being surrendered to me. They wanted, according to custom, they were given to the weapons, less perhaps for what they are worth than because they would attest their victory.

However, the coming and going began. While we made a pile of old flintlock or shotguns near me, and the attention of Christians was entirely absorbed by this operation, a bag was filled with pistols, sabers and daggers. The Muslim women, seeing that nobody cared about them, prepared to leave. They took everything they saved from their homes when they took refuge in this house, clothes, mattresses, blankets, etc., and slipping into a field near where we stood, they gathered in a group where our sailors loaded the bags and blankets on the five donkeys that I brought from Sitia, sitting the old people and children on top. The Turks placed the heaviest objects on their shoulders and will joined the convoy. I gathered, and placed on a donkey, the 24 rifles that I was given; but the bag containing the small arms had disappeared and Christians did not notice it! On the other hand, they claimed that their enemies had 7 Martini rifles and 3 revolvers that they did not see surrendered. Now that the house was evacuated, I allow them to look for them there. But Christians did not wait for this authorization to start looting; they searched everywhere and took away everything the Turks may have forgotten.

At a quarter past noon, our column set out for Sitia by a more direct route than the one we took on the outward journey. In our front went our flags and the headman of Piskoképhalo who would serve to guide us and ensure our passage through the Christian villages that we had to cross. I took the rear with the Master at Arms and 4 sailors to protect the 217 unfortunates we took charge of against the always possible return of their enemies, and to ensure that none of them remained behind. So began our journey home, a biblical exodus in miniature through the mountain, by rough paths where the old men, the women and children advanced with difficulty, often stopping by the side of the path to lay down the burden that crushed their shoulders and to rest for a moment. But they were so happy to have escaped the danger that threatened them night and day, that fatigue did not concern them. They urged each other on, mothers giving up their children to our sailors, the old men leaning on the sailors’ arms, and at the slightest sign from me everyone got back to the march. They had such confidence in us that they didn’t hesitate to follow our flag into the Christian village of Skopi, in spite of knowing how hostile the inhabitants were to them. They packed tightly against each other in these narrow alleys, in the midst of all these armed people who would only have had to extend the arms to strike them and assuage their hatred or revenge upon them.

When the whole column was out of the village, I stopped in the middle of the villagers who filled the path and covered the terraces and houses, and I thanked [the headman], through Mr. Saounazzo, for letting us pass freely. I remind him that, ‘Thanks to you, Commander, 400 of your co-religionists blockaded by the Muslims in Hierapetra were released’. I expressed the firm hope that those who honor themselves with the name of Christians would not show themselves less human than the fanatic disciples of Muhammad. I urged them to lay down their arms, and if they find some Muslim lost or hidden in the mountains, to bring him to us in Sitia. Our words were understood and our feelings well interpreted, because the population expressed the intention to follow our advice, and, in testimony of trust and friendship, women bring us wine, brandy and fill our pockets with lemons and of oranges. At 4.15 a.m. we arrived in Sitia, Muslim woman rushed to meet us and we handed over the 217 prisoners from Paraspori.

In closing, Commander, I must say how satisfied I was the conduct of my 8 sailors and the zeal with which the Master at Arms assisted me. All competed in dedication, helping old men walking, carrying children, taking on their shoulders part of the women’s baggage of the women, and by their gaiety and their spirit, winning everyone’s confidence. I would like to express my gratitude for the extreme kindness of Mr. Saounazzo who, by his perfect knowledge of the Cretans and his eagerness to translate my thoughts, has greatly contributed to the success of my mission.

PIVET.

It’s worth noting that while Sitia was by this time under French control, in early February 1897, before the allocation of the Powers’ secteurs, another sucessful European effort to save civilians from intercommunal violence had featured the Royal Navy.

Capitaine de frégate Louis-Joseph Pivat. c.1895

Louis Joseph Pivet was born in 1855 and joined the Navy in 1872. After his tour in Cretan waters, he continued to enjoy a successful career in the French Navy. He eventually achieved the rank of Rear Amiral and having served for a time as Chief of Staff, retired from active service in March 1917. He died in 1924.[i]

Source of report: H. De La Martiniere (Lieutenant de Vaisseau)

La marine Francaise en Crete

Paris. R. Chapelot Cie. 1911. Appendix III p. 234.

Source: gallica.bnf.fr / Bibliothèque nationale de France

Machine translated and edited for clarity. 20 February 2021

[i] https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Louis-Joseph_Pivet

1897 – Greek Troops land in Crete.

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Popular British and European newspapers of the era represented the despatch of European troops to Crete as being a humanitarian response to the inter-communal violence taking place on the island, and in particular to the outbreaks of violence in Canea in early 1897. To a certain extent this view is still held today in some quarters, the Intervention being portrayed by some as a move aimed at protecting Cretan Christians from the wrath of Cretan Muslims, or vice-versa.

In reality, one of the principal triggers, if not the main one, for the European Intervention was the movement to the island of some 1,500 Greek troops plus artillery. Commanded by Colonel Timeleon Vassos, this force landed on Crete at Kolymbari on 14 February 1897 and eventually established their base at Alikianos.

**The headquarters of the Greek Commander Colonel Vassos at Alykianon near Canea.**
Illustrated London News 24 April 1897.

While this move was apparently hugely popular with a large proportion of the mainland Greek population and enthusiastically welcomed by numerous Cretan Christians, it was considered by the Ottoman Empire to be an invasion of their sovereign territory and a casus belli, an act which would justify them declaring war on Greece. However, Greek and Ottoman interests were not the only ones involved in the situation. Such a war would, in the eyes of the European Powers, have been detrimental to their interests in that it had the potential to involve them in the conflict, an involvement which could produce catastrophic consequences, particularly in the Balkans.

**Greek soldiers about to embark at Athens: A scene outside a café. ’ Off to Crete: The War Fever in Greece**.’
The *Graphic*, 13 March 1897.

**Off to Crete: Greek Troops Embarking at Piraeus**. Supplement to The Graphic, 27 February 1897.

‘The greatest excitement prevailed in Athens when it was known that two regiments were to be sent to Crete. Thousands of people saw them leave Athens on the 13^th inst. And a large and enthusiastic crowd gathered at Piraeus. At two o’clock the first boatload of men was taken on board, and at about six o’clock the first of the steamers cast off amid the deafening cheers of the crowd.’

**Greek Artillery Embarking for Canea at the Piraeus.** Penny Illustrated paper, 27 March 1897.

In the immediate aftermath of Vassos’ landing, the Ottoman Empire, in spite of its apparent legal justification, evinced no great desire to fight a war. In the event, and despite an incident the same day when a Greek warship opened fire on an Ottoman troopship while the latter was withing Cretan waters, the Porte showed a degree of forbearance, relying on the European Powers to act in their, the Powers’, own interests and take steps to punish Greece for its actions. By now the naval forces of the Powers were operating a policy of preventing both Greek and Ottoman reinforcements being sent to the island, a policy which impacted disproportionately on Greek plans since the Ottomans already had a considerable force in situ on Crete, and Greece was unable to reinforce its initial landing. However, the size and the professional nature of the Greek force, along with the presence of Greek warships in Cretan waters off Canea, produced a threat to the town which could not, militarily, be ignored by the Powers.

Consequently, on 15 April 1897, the European Powers commenced landing their forces in Canea; not so much as to protect the civilian populations of either community, but rather to maintain the status quo in the region.

In the event the Intervention was successful at achieving this aim, at least in the short run. When, in late April 1897, Greek actions on its northern borders between Greece and the Ottoman Empire pushed the Empire into declaring war, there was little or no diplomatic support for Greece within Europe. Consequently, the feared spread of the war did not take place.

The outcome of the ‘30 Days War’ was a military defeat for Greece. However, diplomatic pressure on the part of the Powers reigned in the extent of the Ottoman victories. Paradoxically, the Ottoman Empire, though victorious on the battlefield, emerged from the war in a weaker position than it had started.

As for the Greek troops on Crete, other than taking part in a few minor skirmishes shortly after their arrival, they achieved nothing militarily and were withdrawn in mid May 1897. Greece had sent sufficient troops to Crete to start a war, but too few to finish it.

Cashing in on the disturbances – Chocolate and Tapioca.

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A previous post dealt with a series of German adverts relating to the Cretan Intervention.

I have been reminded that the German’s weren’t the only ones cashing in on the situation in Crete to attempt to sell more goods, thie French alsao took the opportunity of European interest in Crete to try to sell chocolates and tapoica. Again, in at least one case, the basis of the advert was a newspaper illustration., an illustration that was also used in the post linked to above.

Choclolate Louit’s interpretation of the Gendarmerie mutiny of 2 March 1897.

It’s notworthy that in spite of copying the illustration from a French weekly journal, the chocolate company got the date wrong!

Soleil Du Dimanche view of the Gemdarmerie mutiny.

Chocolat D’Aiguebelle’s interpretation of refugees fleeing to the mountains.

Chocolat D’Aiguebelle’s interpretation of the bombardmernt of Canea.

Note that on the 28th March 1897, the date on the card, there does not appear to have been any European naval activity which could be described as ‘The Bombardment of Canea.’ Presumably the event depicted is relasted to oner of the earlier occasions on which the European naval forces opened fire on Cretan Christian insurgents.

Massacres dArménie, chromolithographies publicitaires éditées par la Chocolaterie d’Aiguebelle, Monastère de la Trappe (Drôme), et par la société des Tapioca de l’Etoile,

The caption refers to Armemians being massacred in Iraklion, but although there were undoubtedly a small number of Armenians on Crete in the late 19th century, there does not appear to be any record of them being singled out for attack by the Ottoman authorities.

The card is one of a series showing scenes from the Armenian Massacres which occurred between 1894 and 1896. As far as the author can make out, this series appears to have been a joint production between the chocolate manufacturer ‘Chocolat d’Aiguebelle’, a company owned by Catholic Trappist monks, and the tapioca manufacturer ‘Tapioca De L’Etoile’, a company about which little can be found in an internet search. The full series of the cards can be seen herehere.

Austo-Hugarian Navy off Kissamos Kastelli. April 1897.

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A report in the Scottish newspaper the Scotsman date-lined Canea 7.30 p.m. on Wednesday 7th April 1897, stated that:

“The insurgents of the district of Kissamo have addressed a letter to the Admirals to warn them of a projected attack on the fort. The Turkish garrison asks to be relieved.”

Similar reports of insurgents gathering around Kissamos suggested that they were armed with four or five mountain guns, previously captured from the Ottomans (or more likely supplied by the Greek forces under Colonel Vassos.) In response to this threat, on Thursday 8th April 1897, the Austrian Zara class torpedo cruiser S.M. S. Sebenico proceeded to Kissamos. Reuters reported the events that followed:

“On Thursday the Austrian cruiser [Sebenico]* arrived at Kissamos and hoisted a flag of truce and sent off a boat with two soldiers and mails for the garrison of the fort. The boat was fired upon by the insurgents, and the [Sebenico] replied, first with her quick-firing guns, and finally with a 6.inch gun. The insurgents then ceased firing. On Friday morning boats sent from the Austrian squadron to embark refugees were fired upon. The squadron thereupon approached the shore and opened fire, expending eighty shells. This silenced the Insurgents’ fire, and the boats took off twenty seven women, children, and old men. The boats on leaving were again fired upon.” [* Erroneously stated in the report to be the Stephanie, (S.M.S. Kronprinzessin Erzherzogin Stephanie) another Austro-Hungarian vessel also on station in Crete.]
Reynold’s Newspaper Sunday 11 April 1897.

Austro-Hungarian torpedo cruiser S.M.S. Sebenico.

The Austro-Hungarian navy was not alone in this action; In company with, and under the command of S.M.S. Sebenico, H.M.S. Fearless, a Scout Class Torpedo Cruiser captained by Commander Charles E. Gladstone, was also involved in evacuating women and children from the Ottoman fort on 9th April. They too were fired on by insurgents and both the Austro-Hungarian and the British ships opened fire to cover the embarkation.
A British newspaper described the action:

“The latest authentic news from Kissamos Kastelli, where the insurgents are pressing hard upon the Turkish garrison, is that the Austrian gun-boat Sebenico has succeeded in taking off about, I believe, one hundred women and children The blue-jackets were repeatedly fired on during the operation Reconnaissance’s from the war-ships have completely failed to discover the five guns which the insurgents were reported to have placed position. The Fearless, third-class cruiser, which is now at Kissainos, is likely to remain there, since it is an Austrian station; and Captain Rainier, of the Rodney, who returned to duty on Saturday, is senior to the Austrian captain, who directed the operations during his absence from illness.
An English cattle-steamer has been captured by a cruiser, its commander being unable to produce the proper papers. In future, every British vessel will obliged to carry a prearranged document, setting forth its character, destination, and other formal particulars.”
St James’ Gazette 12 April 1897

Over the next few days two Ottoman blockhouses were evacuated and one set on fire to destroy it, the other apparently had nothing flammable in it. It was then decided to destroy the blockhouses by naval gunfire as reported by Commander Gladstone.

“All ships present opened fire on the east block-house, distant 3,800 yards, and expended a considerable amount of ammunition. The result was that the walls were knocked down to a certain extent, but the ruins remain just as effective as a protection for riflemen as they were before, and it would be an impossible task to level the building to the ground by gunfire.” (National Archive. ADM116/92 Enclosure 185. Commander Gladstone to Rear Admiral Harris, 14 April 1897.)

Dr Duclot’s maps

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On 11^th February 1897, the French 3^rd Class Protected Cruiser le Troude, commanded by M. le capitaine de fregate Aubert, arrived off Crete.

French Protected Cruiser Le Troude.

On board her was the ship’s Doctor, Dr.Dominique-Noel-Joseph Duclot. During her service off Crete, which lasted until October 1897, Dr. Duclot travelled around and upon the island taking a series of photographs which in 1898 would be included in his book, En Crete.

En Crete

Along with various photographs he also included two maps. One of them, as might be expected, showed the physical layout of the island.

‘Physical’ map of Crete.

The other map however, showed the political division of Crete; not the more usual map included in such publications presumably showing the manner in which the Powers divided their secteurs, but rather one showing the Ottoman administrative division of the ‘Vilayet’ of Crete into its various ‘Sanjaks’.

Duclot’s ‘Political’ map of Crete.

Comparison with the post 1897, European division of the island shows that the Powers kept largely to the Ottoman boundaries, no doubt for administrative convenience, though merging two of the sanjaks to create the Russian secteur and creating the International secteur around Canea.

Map of the European Secteurs of Crete. Map prepared for Colonel Herbert Chermside, Commander of British troops, in April 1898.

Protecting Ottoman shipping

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In early February 1897 fighting was taking place throughout Crete between Insurgents and regular and irregular Ottoman forces, Greek volunteers from the mainland were still arriving on the island, and two Greek naval flotillas were en-route. One of them was to land troops under Colonel Vassos at Platanias, the other, the sloop Sphacteria accompanied by four torpedo-boats, the latter under the command of Prince George of Greece, was bound for Canea.

The European Powers, which already had their warships in Crete had, by this time and after much deliberation and many complaints and threats of war from the Porte, agreed a response should matters escalate. Although a formal blockade of the island was not yet in force and wouldn’t commence until 21 March,[1] upon the appearance of Greek warships, the Powers determined to prevent Greek aggression in Crete, by the use of force if necessary.^[2] On 12^th February 1897 Rear- Admiral Harris, Senior British naval Officer, was informed:

“Admiralty telegraph that you should concert with the naval Commanders of the other Powers in the event of need, for the prevention of any aggressive action on the part of Greek ships of war which have been despatched to Crete, and in general for the adoption of any measures which the circumstances may render expedient. Act accordingly, and report fully by telegraph action taken or about to be taken.”[3]

The stance of the French Navy was confirmed the following day, the Admiralty informing Harris that the French Admiral had the authority ‘to oppose by combined action, if necessary, and after employing all the means of persuasion and intimidation in their power, an aggressive action by the Greek ships of war’ and ‘the agreement between the commanders should be recorded in writing.’^[4]

While the political decisions had been taken in the European capitals, in Crete, matters were coming to a head. In response to the disturbances on the east of the island, the Ottoman authorities attempted, on the 12^th of February, to reinforce the garrison at Sitia by sending troops from Candia on board the lightly armed despatch vessel Foud. This troop movement was intercepted within Cretan waters by the Greek unprotected Cruiser Admiral Miaulis which opened fire on the Foud, preventing her from landing her troops and forcing her to return to Candia.

The British magazine The Graphic, reported the incident on 27^th February as follows:

Miaulis firing on Faoud. Graphic 27 February 1897

‘A British naval officer, describing the firing of the first shot in the present crisis by the Greek warship Miaulis, which attacked a Turkish despatch boat on the 12^th inst., says:- “The Turkish despatch boat arrived here on the 11^th, and on the 12^th took troops on board and weighed anchor. However, the Greek warship was before her, and was already under way with top-gallant masts housed…. The Turk steered along the coast of Crete with the Greek about half a mile astern of her. Matters proceeded thus until the Turk stopped off Sitia (about fifty miles east of Candia), and attempted to land her troops. As soon as the Greek saw this she fired a gun across her bows, and two more, which went over her. The Turk, evidentially thinking that discretion was the better part of valour, embarked her men again and came back here, where she anchored, but she still has her troops on board.’[5]

The incident had almost immediate consequences. On hearing of it, Sir Alfred Biliotti, British Consul on Crete, sent an urgent telegraph to the Foreign Office at 8 a.m. on 13^th February:

‘I have just heard from the Vali that the Turkish steam yacht “Fuad” sailed for Sitia, having on board one company of soldiers and one of gendarmes. Greek iron-clad followed it as it left Candia, and fired on it and compelled it to put back. The Mussulmans are greatly excited, and unless the steam-yacht can leave Candia tomorrow for its destination in safety the most serious consequences may ensue.’[6]

The Foreign Office’s response was swift. By 12.40 p.m. that day, Lord Salisbury, the British Foreign Minister, set in motion instructions to the Royal Navy Commanders on the spot to “inform the Greek naval Commander that, as no declaration of war has been made, the will not be allowed to open fire upon Turkish ships in Cretan waters” and asked the other Powers present to instruct their Naval forces to do likewise.[7]

Although the date of the reaction isn’t made clear, it was either the 12^th or the 13^th of February, shortly after the Miaulis fired on the Fuad, the Royal Navy took steps to intervene:

‘Captain Grenfell, of Her Majesty’s Ship “Trafalgar”, stationed at Candia, strongly remonstrated with the Captain of the “Miaulis” for this breach of international law and received his parole not to repeat the offense.’[8]

By 14^th February the Fuad had arrived off Canea where, by now, Prince George and his ships had arrived. The arrival in Canea of the Fuad, which, as an Ottoman vessel in the waters of an Ottoman island, was perfectly entitled to be there, produced an unfavourable reaction from the Greek vessels. According to British accounts, the torpedo-boats in the company of the Sphacteria appeared to behave in a manner which threatened the Ottoman steam-yacht. In response to the torpedo-boats’ actions, the British and European warships cleared for action and prepared to fire on the Greek vessels.

The Watchers watched.

“A Turkish troopship arrived off Canea on the 14^th, and almost directly afterwards a Greek cruiser, with Prince George of Greece on board, in company with four torpedo-boats, came up. The torpedo-boats hovered stealthily about the anchorage, closely watched by the British and foreign warships, which cleared to fire on the Greek scouts if necessary. The Turkish transport got underway as soon as possible and proceeded to Suda.”

Fortunately for Prince George and the Greek Navy, there being no possibility whatsoever of the out-fighting the forces of the European Powers, the incident came to nothing. Rear-Admiral Harris reported:

‘The Captain of the Sphacteria and Prince George paid an official visit to me and made no secret of their intention to acts of hostility with a view to an insurrection in favour of replacing the Turkish by the Greek Government. They seemed greatly disappointed and disquieted when I informed them of my orders to prevent any aggressive action’.^[9]

Shortly after this, the Greek warships departed Crete and returned to Greece. However, if the author of an article in the Graphic is to be believed, the Sphacteria was still in Cretan waters on 19 February and made a further attempt to interdict an Ottoman vessel.

Sissoi Veliky intercepting Sphacteria. Supplement to The Graphic, 6 March 1897.

“On the morning of February 19 a Turkish transport, with only a few wounded men on board, left Canea for the westward. The Greek corvette Sfaktirea (sic) suddenly steamed out and tried to intercept her. The Turk immediately altered her course man-of-war towards where the fleet of foreign warships were lying. The Russian man-of-war Sissoi Veikey (sic) was at once despatched to her assistance and conveyed her clear of the island, the Greek corvette retired.”

The Foud [alt. Fauod, Fauot] was a British build steam Despatch vessel. Laid down in Milwall, south London, in 1884, she was launched in 1885. In 1908 she was a stationary hulk in Thessaloniki, used as a hospital ship. There she was captured by the Greeks in November 1912. According to one account, upon capture,she was taken into the Greek Navy before being returned to Turkey in 1919 and eventually scrapped in 1921.[10]

Ottoman Despatch vessel Fuod/Fauod.

The Admiral Miaulis [Ναυαρχος Μιαουλης] was an iron-hulled, barque-rigged unprotected Cruiser, laid down in France in 1878 and launched in 1879. In 1900 she made history by being the first ship in the Greek Navy to make an official visit to the United States of America.[11] She became a gunnery training hulk in 1912 and was eventually scrapped in 1931.[12]

Admiral Miaoulis-1897

Admiral Miaoulis 1900.

Admiral Maioulis in Valetta 1904.

[1] [C8437] Turkey No.10 (1897) Further Correspondence respecting the affairs in Crete (In continuation of “Turkey No.8 (1897)” and in completion of “Turkey No.9 (1897)”. No.291 Harris to Admiralty, 18 March 1897.

[2] [C. 8664] Turkey. No. 11 (1897). Correspondence respecting the affairs of Crete and the war between Turkey and Greece. [Hereafter: Turkey No. 11, 1897.] No. 74. Monson to Salisbury, 13 February 1897

[3] [C8429] Turkey No. 9, 1897. Reports on the situation in Crete. [Hereafter Turkey No.9, 1897.] No. 1 Rear-Admiral Harris to Admiralty 24 February 1897.

[4] Turkey No. 11, 1897. No. 92. Admiralty to Harris, 13 February 1897.

[5] Supplement to Graphic 27 February 1897.

[6] Turkey No. 11, 1897. No. 73. Included in Salisbury to Sir E Monson, Ambassador to Paris, 13 February 1897.

[7] Turkey No. 11, 1897. No. 73. Salisbury to Sir E Monson, Ambassador to Paris, 13 February 1897.

[8] Turkey No. 9, 1897. No. 1 Rear-Admiral Harris to Admiralty 24 February 1897.

[9] Turkey No. 9, 1897. No. 1 Rear-Admiral Harris to Admiralty 24 February 1897.

[10] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_patrol_vessels_of_the_Ottoman_steam_navy#Fuad

[11] http://www.navypedia.org/ships/greece/gr_cr_navarchos_miaoulis.htm

[12] http://www.navypedia.org/ships/greece/gr_cr_navarchos_miaoulis.htm

Prince George arrives.

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Prince George meets his escort. The Illustrated London News, 7 January 1899

Prince george en-route to Crete on board the French warship Bugeaud. The Graphic, 7 January 1899.

The illustrations show the European naval escort provided by the four Powers, France, Britain, Russia and Italy, to bring Prince George of Greece to take up his role as High Commissioner for Crete. Appointed only after much diplomatic wrangling which went on for a considerable time after the decision to make Crete an Autonomous State under Ottoman suzerainty, and without any input from the Cretan people, his arrival on Crete on 21st December 1898 was delayed further by arguments over his mode of transport and the flag he was to fly.

The original, Greek, proposal was that he be taken to Crete from Greece in a Greek warship, a suggestion which met with approval only from the Greeks. The next, Greek, proposal was that he be taken to the island in a civilian vessel flying a Greek flag; again only the Greeks found favour with this. Eventually he was told that he would be taken to Crete in a European warship escorted by other European warships, flying their respective flags; making the point to all concerned, including George, although later events would show he appeared incapable of getting the message, that his, George’s, appointment was made by the power and authority of the four Powers and no one else.

There was however, a last minute hitch when an argument broke out over the nature of the flag of the newly autonomous island. The symbolism of the flag eventually chosen referred to religious distribution of the population of the island; three quarters Christian represented as a blue field enfolded in a white cross, and one quarter Muslim, represented by a white star on a red field.

Flag of the Cretan Autonomous State. Shown on a souvenir card c.1902.

The initial proposal put forward by the Committee of four Admirals from the Powers who were effectively ruling the island prior to George’s arrival, possibly at the suggestion of the Russian Admiral, was that the flag would consist of a the same blue field, white cross and red upper left quarter BUT that instead of the Muslim star, there would be a further white cross.

Contemporary sketch of proposed Cretan Flag.

The British Ambassadors in both Constantinople and St. Petersburg (Leningrad), raised objections to the proposal pointing out that it would be viewed by the Ottoman authorities and the Cretan Muslims as a provocation, since it could, and probably would, be interpreted as indicating Christian dominance of the Muslim population. The idea was dropped, although this ‘illegal’ version of the flag of the Cretan Autonomous State did still appear on the island on at least one occasion.

When he did arrive, he was initially greeted with some enthusiasm by both Christian and Muslim Cretans. This enthusiasm however, was to fade over time as his autocratic tendencies came to the fore.

Arrival of Prince George at Suda bay.

The guard in the photograph consists of British sailors. Their presence wasn’t only ceremonial. One of the seamen involved in escorting George, Thomas Willis serving on H.M.S. Dido described the steps taken to protect George:

” … we had the pleasure of taking prince George of Greece, to take over the Government of the place, landed him at candia and lined the streets with 40 rounds of Ball cartridges as he did not know how the people would receive him But they received him all right the next day we paraded before him with 40 rounds of Ball cartridge after that we went back to Malta….”[1]

(Spelling and punctuation as in the original.)

Arrival of Prtince George in Canea.

Arrival of prince George in Candia (Iraklion).

The arrival of Prince George in Candia (Iraklion)

[1] National Maritime Museum. JOD 207 Thomas Willis A.B. Undated document.

European Navies to the rescue

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On the night of 21/22 February 1907, the Austro-Hungarian Lloyds steam ship Imperatrix, ran aground off the south west coast of Crete on the island of Elaphonissi.

Austro Lloyds SS Imperatrix

When word of the shipwreck eventually reached Canea, the response was immediate and a number of the stationnaire vessels, those kept in Crete by the European Powers to maintain their influence and support the European troops on the island, set out to aid in the rescue attempts. Two Russian, one French and one Italian vessels took part in the mission, although the surviving crew and passengers from the Imperatrix were eventually evacuated aboard anothe Austro-Hungarian Llloyds vessel, the Castore.

While the names of the rescue vessels are known, the details of the class and type of the vessel involved in the rescue vary considerably depending on the source.

Imperial Russian Navy – Khivinetz (Cruiser, Gun Boat, Motor Torpedo Boat)

HIRMS Khivenitz. Suda Bay 1909

Built in the New Admiralty Yards in St Petersburg 1905.[1] Twin Funnel 1316 tons 200 crew. Sister ship to “Giliak” and “Korietz”. 8 triple expansion Belville boilers giving designed output of 1400 HP driving twin screws; designed top speed 13 knots.[2]

Armament in 1907, 2 x 4.7-inch guns firing fore and aft, 8 x 12lb guns in centrally mounted sponsons, 2 MG.

In 1914 she was part of the Russian Baltic Fleet and is listed as taking part, under the command of Captain 2^nd Rank SA Paskin, in the defence of the Baltic coast against a German invasion in ‘Operation Albion’ in September /October 1917. At this time the Khivinetz belonged to the 7^th Division of Torpedo Boat destroyers, part of the Riga Bay Operations Group under Admiral Bachirev, having started the war as a detached unit in the Abo – Oland sector of the Baltic.

Disarmed April 1919

Imperial Russian Navy – No. 212 (Guardship, Torpedo boat, Motor torpedo boat)

HIRM Torpedo Boat No.212

The history of this vessel is complicated by the fact that she changed nationality several times, reflecting the complicated state of Finnish/Russian relations in the period immediately after the First World War. Depending on the sources used, she was built by the Finnish ship builders Wm. Crichton either in Ochta Yards, St Petersburg, or the Wm. Crichton yard in Turku in 1900 or 1902, under the title/number “Minonosets 212”[3]. If the vessel was that built in St Petersburg, her shipyard number was 528.

Twin Funnel ‘Yarrow ‘type.[4] 186 tons, 2500 HP, top speed 22 knots, armed with two torpedo tubes. Taken into the Finnish navy in 1917 and served under the title “S6” until 1920 when she was returned to the USSR under the Treaty of Tarto.

Alternatively:

HIRM Torpedo boat No 212

Destroyer No. 212, and 213. Russia 1903 – Built at the Okhta shipyard in St. Petersburg. The normal displacement was 205 tons. The waterline 52.3 m long, 5.25 m wide, average draft 1.6 m. The twin-shaft steam power plant had an output of 3,500 hp giving a speed of 24 knots. Armament: three torpedo tubes, three 37 mm Hotchkiss guns. In 1914, they were rearmed: the 37-mm guns removed and two 47-mm and two machine guns were installed. In 1917 they were reclassified as minesweepers. In 1918, No. 212 was captured by Finland and renamed S-6; in 1922 it was returned to the USSR and scrapped.[5]

French Navy – Faucon (Cruiser, Torpedo Cruiser)

French Navy vessel ‘Vautour’. Sister ship to Faucon.

“Condor” Class Torpedo Cruiser launched in 1887. Single funnel, 1240 tons, 134 Crew.

Designed HP 3500 – 4000, designed top speed 18 – 20 knots.[6]

Armament: 5 x 4inch guns, 6 x 3 lb guns, 4 x 1lb gun, 5 x 14-inch torpedo tubes;

11/2-inch deck armour. Listed in 1914 as being part of the 1^st Submarine Squadron based in Cherbourg.

While according to another source, these torpedo cruisers were six one-funnelled ships with plough bow, considerable tumbelhome, forecastle and poop, classed as crusiers whereas they were more torpedo gunboat, somewhat large at 1,230 tonnes. The Condor, Epervier, Faucon and Vautour (birds of prey) were laid down in 1884, launched 1885-89 and completed in 1886-89, at Rochefort and Toulon. They had two shafts IC or HC engines 4 cyl. boilers for 3000 ihp and 17 knots, armed with five 3.9 in, four 3-pdr, six 1-pdr and four 14 in TTs. All were discarded between 1907 and 1911.[7]

Italian Navy – Regina Marina Curtatone (Gunboat)

Regia Marina Curtatone

Single funnel, 3 masts. Built Venice 1888. 1156 tons. Designed HP – 1100 giving designed 11.5 knots.

Armament: 4 x 4.7- inch guns, 4 x 6lb guns, 2 x 1lb guns (plus torpedoes?)

NB, This is NOT the Italian Torpedo Boat of the same name that sank in the Aegean on 20 May 1941 after hitting a mine whilst guiding part of the German invasion flotilla en-route to Crete.

[1] Janes Fighting Ships 1907 and subsequent editions

[2] Janes Fighting Ships 1907 lists 6 boilers, later editions list 8

[3] Janes Fighting Ships 1914

[4] According to Janes Fighting Ships 1914, ‘Normand’ type according to later editions.

[5] http://foto-i-mir.ru/squadron-minesweepers/

[6] Janes Fighting Ships 1907 states of Faucon and her sister ships ‘…present speeds very poor indeed.’

[7] https://www.naval-encyclopedia.com/ww1/France/french-cruisers However, another sources states that the Foucon was stricken from the French naval list in 1920. http://www.navypedia.org/ships/france/fr_dd_condor.htm

Russian Poles In Crete

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During the Intervention in Crete, Russia had responsibility for the control of the secteur of Rethymno. The bulk of their forces, other than a small detachment in the International zone in Canea, were based in barracks below the Venetian Fortezza. In 1899, on the orders of the Russian governor Theodore de Hiostak, Russian troops constructed, within the Fortezza, the chapel of Agios Theodoros Trichinas.

Agios Theodoros Trichinas

However, this building would not have satisfied the spiritual needs of one portion of the Russian military: Those who were Roman Catholics and would today be identified as Poles rather than Russians since, at the time of the Intervention, Poland did not exist, having finally been partitioned between Prussia, later Germany, Austria, later Austro-Hungary, and Russia in the wake of the Napoleonic Wars.

The Russian Empire made deliberate efforts to stamp out Polish nationalism and, after 1864, what education there was had to be conducted in Russian, even in elementary schools. Private education in Polish was forbidden, and young men were liable to conscription as ordinary soldiers in the Russian army if they failed to pass Russian High School exams.[1] On January 1, 1874 , a statute concerning conscription was approved by the Tsar by which military service was made compulsory for all males at the age of 20, including ‘Polish’ Russians. It is unsurprising then that amongst the Russian troops sent to Crete in 1897, there would be a number of conscripts, and possibly some officers, who would now be considered to be Polish – what they considered themselves to be is unknown. One source states that 200-300 ‘Poles’ served in Crete.[2]

One of the main defining characteristics of ‘Polishness’ for those living in Russia was an individual’s religion; the overwhelming majority of ‘Poles’ being Roman Catholic rather than Russian Orthodox. It has to be assumed that the Russian military had some mechanism to cope with the presence of Roman Catholic troops. It is clear that at least some ‘Polish’ troops were allowed to interact with the local Catholic clergy in Canea and the Catholic church in Rethymno acknowledges the role played by ‘Polish’ soldiers in its construction.[3]

‘Polish’ Officers with Catholic priest. Canea 1898.

In Rethymno there appear to initially have been language difficulties in that the local Catholic priest, a Sicilian, could not understand his new parishioners; a problem which was overcome at the beginning of 1899, when a Polish speaking priest Marcin Czermiński came to Rethymno, becoming the de facto Catholic chaplain of the 13^th Rifle Regiment of Riflemen in which the ‘Poles’ served.[4]

Russian troops. 7Co 13 Regiment. Canea unknown date

However, an issue clearly arose when any of these ‘Polish’ troops died when in Crete. While Russian Orthodox troops could be buried in Greek Orthodox graveyards, Roman Catholic troops could not. This led to 18 ‘Polish’ soldiers being buried, not alongside their Orthodox colleagues in the churchyard of the large church of Agios Konstantinos and Eleni in Rethymno, but in a small, physically separate, cemetery nearby at the junction of Odos Tim. Vassou, and Odos Kriari.

Catholic cemetery Rethymno March 2018

Catholic cemetery Rethymno March 2018

Plaque on ourtside wall of Catholic cemetery Rethymno. March 2018

‘Polish’ soldiers’ graves. Catholic cemetery Rethymno.

(Unfortunately, the wording on the plaque, erected in 1933, is misleading. The ‘Polish’ soldiers did not die fighting for the ‘Freedom of Greece.’ They died as apart of the International force which was on Crete ostensibly to keep the peace between Cretan Muslims and Cretan Christians, but more specifically, to prevent the union of Crete and Greece and, after December 1898, to maintain the autonomous status of Crete.)

‘Polish’ soldier’s grave. Catholic cemetery Rethymno.

The names of the dead soldiers are not on their tombstones, but, along with their date of death, are recorded on a plaque on the wall inside the cemetery.

‘Polish’ memorial Rethymno

Ten of the 18 died within a three-month period between November 1898 and January 1899. In late October 1898, the Acting British Consul in Odessa reported to Sir Nicholas O’Connor, the British Ambassador to the Ottoman Empire, that sickness amongst the Russian troops in Crete was disrupting Russian plans for replacement and reinforcement on the island.[5] It is quite possible then that these ten men were part of that reported ‘sickness’ outbreak. Although of the 30 or so Orthodox Russian soldiers mentioned on gravestones or memorials in the nearby Orthodox churchyard, only two date from late 1898 to early 1899. One Polish source[6] states that three ‘Polish’ soldiers died as a result of clashes during the Theriso revolt, and the Catholic memorial lists three who died between March and November 1905, the period of the Revolt.

Many thanks to the following for their help in this article.

Dominique Kuczynska for the Polish translations

Jean-Pierre Destelle for getting access to the, normally locked, cemetery in Rethymno.

[1] http://acienciala.faculty.ku.edu/hist557/lect6.htm

[2]http://hellenopolonica.blogspot.com/2014/07/cmentarz-polski-w-rethymno.html Accessed 13 Nov. 2019.

[3] https://talesofcrete.wordpress.com/2016/11/26/the-catholic-church-of-st-anthony-in-rethymno/

[4] http://hellenopolonica.blogspot.com/2014/07/cmentarz-polski-w-rethymno.html Accessed 13 Nov. 2019.

[5] National Archive. ADM 116/93

[6] http://hellenopolonica.blogspot.com/2014/07/cmentarz-polski-w-rethymno.html Accessed 13 Nov. 2019.